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Abstract
The Stable Marriage Problem is to find a one-to-one matching for two equally
sized sets of agents. Due to its widespread applications in the real world, es-
pecially the unique importance to the centralized match maker, a very large
number of questions have been extensively studied in this field. This arti-
cle considers a generalized form of stable marriage problem, where different
numbers of men and women need to be matched pairwise and the emergence
of single is inevitable. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulations con-
firm that even small deviations from equal number of two sides can have a
large impact on matching solution of Gale-Shapley Algorithm. These results
provide insights to many of the real-world applications when matching two
sides with unequal number.
1. Introduction
The Stable Marriage Problem(SMP), as the name suggests, is a study of
two groups of men and women, who need to be matched pairwise. In addition,
there are also extensive applications in college admissions[1], labor markets[2]
and many other social systems[3]. The recent advances in Internet technology
have introduced the stable marriage problem into new application scenarios,
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for example, assigning a large number of users to internet server[4], matching
peers in a P2P network according to preference[5], the resource allocation in
5G networks[6], and the matching mechanism of real-world dating website[7],
etc.
Many researchers studied the algorithms and properties on this fasci-
nating and practical problem. The study of the Stable marriage problem
originated from 1962, the Gale-Shapley algorithm was proposed[1], and the
algorithm guarantees that there is always a stable match for an equal number
of men and women[8]. In 2012, the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded
to Lloyd S. Shapley and Alvin E. Roth ”for the theory of stable allocations
and the practice of market design.” In this algorithm, each unengaged man
issues proposal to his favorite woman who has not yet rejected him, and the
woman comes to decide which one to choose, compares this suitor with the
current provisional partner, and retains the one that is more desirable to her.
This solution is proved to be one of the stable men-optimal solutions.
Besides mathematicians and computer scientists, statistical physicists are
also interested in this issue[9, 10]. They have introduced many theoretical
methods which is used to deal with the statistical properties of a large number
of interacting particles to the Stable Marriage Problem and have made many
contributions. The mean field theory was applied to calculate satisfaction
of both men and women in the stable marriage problem, and it was found
that men, who are the active side, were far happier than women[11]. This
method can also be used to estimate the number of stable solutions[12, 13].
The replica method used in Spin glass is applied to study the global optimal
solution in bipartite matching, although this is not a stable solution[14–17].
In addition, some interesting varied issues have been studied, such as the
impact of matching on the matching of partial information[18, 19], spatial
distribution, intrinsic fitness[20], and acceptance threshold[13].
So far, main stream research has been focusing on the matching of equal
number of the two sides. In fact, however, real-world matching problems
are seldom a match of precisely equal size of two sides. We have seen many
examples in daily life, the student adminssion, job market, the recent ’One
to one Poverty Alleviation Program’ policy promoted by the Chinese gov-
ernment, or even the real application of SMP- the marriage matching on
dating website[7] etc. These problems are mostly not a matching between
equal number of both sides. We are curious to know, whether the original
stable solution of Gale-Shapley Algorithm can be applied in these unequal
size matching problems, and if not, how would the stable solution of match-
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ing be changed? What is the overall happiness of all agents in the stable
solution? Many more interesting question may be asked. Here in this paper,
we extend the Stable Marriage Problem to a Generalized Stable Marriage
Problem(GSMP), which represents a matching between any given size of
the two sides. Dzierzawa and Ome´ro[13] implemented the numerical simu-
lation to test the matching result of N + 1 men and N women, and their
simulation shows women in this case are far happier than men according
to Gale-Shapley Algorithm, which is hugely different from what the orig-
inal SMP stable solution suggests. This is crucial because it reveals that
the Gale-Shapley solution is very sensitive to even the smallest variation in
the number of people and actually cannot be directly used to analyze many
unequal sized matchign problems. We further thoroughly study the stable
solution in GSMP, a matching between any number of men and women. We
carry out a theoretical analysis of the stable solution fo GSMP and obtain
the average happiness for men and women for any given population, and the
result is in perfect match with the numerical simulations.
2. Method
The model starts with the scenario that N male and M females need to
be matched pairwise. Here we assume that everyone knows all people from
the opposite sex, and there is a wish list for each person which represents
the ranking of all agents from the other side according to her/his preference.
Following many previous research models, a reasonable and simplest assump-
tion is that all wish lists are randomly established and irrelevant. We define
an energy function for each agent, which is equal to the ranking of the final
partner in their wish list. The lower energy one has, the happier the person
is. When N = M , it is the conventional bipartite matching problem. Here
we extend to the bipartite matching of any size of two sides. When N 6= M ,
obviously there will be some people who will remain single. For these agents,
their energy is defined as one worse than the bottom of the wish list, that is
to say, the energy is M + 1 for single men, and N + 1 for women. Since the
number of single persons is obvious, the result of the calculation can be sim-
ply converted Defined for other. Here, we use the Greek letter to represent
men and English letters to represent women. Their energy is denoted as em,
ew respectively.
The G-S algorithm runs as follows: unengaged men will continue to send
proposals to women, and women keep the one she prefers between suitor and
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her provisional partner. The process terminates until no man issues proposal
again, either all men are engaged, or the unengaged men are rejected by
everyone. For N <= M , this means that all men are engaged. For the case
of N > M , N −M men are rejected by all women, and the rest M men are
engaged.
3. Result and Discussion
The Stable Marriage Problem of equal size of the two sides has been
thoroughly studied by many previous researches. For M = N , several stud-
ies have proved that in the stable solution of Gale-Sharpley Algorithm, the
average energy of women is ǫm = log(N), and the average energy of men is
ǫw = N/log(N).
3.1. Matching for M > N
(a) The average energy of men
First, let us consider the situation that number of womenM is larger than
the number of men N . During the process of men proposing to women, we
notice that: 1). The total energy of men equals to the number of proposals
men have already sent. 2). Once a woman is engaged, she will remain
engaged (perhaps with different men) forever, that is to say the number of
partners will never decrease.
Now We focus on the number of matched pairs in the proposing process, if
it increases to N, every man has already been assigned with one partner and
the proposal process will terminate. When the number of matched pairs is K,
there will be M-K women who remain unengaged. If one proposal is sent to
an engaged woman, no matter the suitor or the womans current provisional
partner wins, the number of matched pairs will not change. If a proposal
is sent to an unengaged woman, which has a probability of (M-K)/M, the
number of matched pairs will increase to K+1. It is easy to know that on
average M/(M-K) proposals have to be sent to match one more pair.
Thus, in order to increase the number of matched pairs from 0 to N, the
expected number of proposals all men have to send is
LN,M =
N−1∑
K=0
M
M −K
= M(
M∑
i=1
1
i
−
M−N∑
j=1
1
j
) (1)
Hence, the average energy of men when M > N is
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ǫm =
LN,M
N
=
M
N
ln
M
M −N
(2)
(b) The average energy of women
To obtain the average energy of women ǫm, let us consider the final stable
solution, in which everyone’s partner has been determined. let us assume a
woman who was finally paired with the man ranked β in her list, so men who
ranked higher than β in her list did not issue proposal to her. According to
the ranking of the men in the women’s list, let us denote the men’s energy as
follows: ǫm(α), α ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}. The men who ranked in the top β − 1 in
the woman’s list must have a better partner than the woman, which means
the energy of the woman is higher than that of the assigned partners of these
men. This is because if the rank of the lady in a certain men’s list is less than
the energy value of the him, then he must have already issued a proposal to
the woman according to the Gale-Shapley Algorithm, and thus causing a
conflict. So we can calculate the probability of a woman matched with her
ranking β man is:
Pβ =
β−1∏
α=1
(1−
ǫm(α)
M
) ∗
ǫm(β)
M
(3)
For the unengaged women, we denote their energy as N+1. These agents
have not received any proposal, the probability is:
PN+1 =
N∏
α=1
(1−
ǫm(α)
M
) (4)
Similarly, we use ǫm to replace ǫm(α), then we have:
Pβ = (1−
ǫm
M
)β−1 ∗
ǫm
M
(5)
PN+1 = (1−
ǫm
M
)N (6)
Consider ǫw =
∑
β ∗ pβ, we can estimate the average energy of women:
ǫw =
ǫm
M
N∑
i=1
i ∗ (1−
ǫm
M
)i−1 + (N + 1) ∗ (1−
ǫm
M
)N (7)
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The series summation gives:
ǫw =
ǫm
M
1− (1−ǫm
M
)N
( ǫm
M
)2
+ (1−
ǫm
M
)N (8)
Since we have ǫm =
M
N
ln M
M−N
, (1− ǫm
M
)N approxiemately equals to M−N
M
ǫw =
N
ǫm
+
M −N
M
, (9)
and also we can see:
ǫw ∗ ǫm ≃ N (10)
3.2. Matching for M < N
(a) The average energy of women
While M < N , let us denote the energy of each women as ǫi, and the
average of ǫi is denoted by ǫw.
In the final matching state, all the women are matched but N −M men
are left single. The probability of a man being single is
∏M
i=1(1− ǫi/N), i.e.,
he ranks worse than any of the current partner in women’s lists. In total we
have N −M men who are single, which means the probability of being single
is (N −M)/N , so we have:
M∏
i=1
(1−
ǫi
N
) =
N −M
N
(11)
Approxiemately, we use ǫw to replace ǫi,
(1−
ǫw
N
)M =
N −M
N
(12)
take the logarithm of both sides we have:
ǫw =
N
M
ln
N
N −M
(13)
(b) The average energy of men
Let us consider the final stable state of matching which we know the exact
matching result of everyone. For a man j, we denote the energy of women
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in his list as ǫw(j), j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}. Then we have the probability that he
was accepted by the woman ranked ith in his list:
Qi =
i−1∏
j=1
(1−
ǫw(j)
N
)
ǫw(i)
N
(14)
And the probability that he was rejected by all woman is (we assume the
energy of finally single man is M + 1):
QM+1 =
M∏
j=1
(1−
ǫw(j)
N
) (15)
We can approxiemate ǫw(j) with the mean value ǫw, for N is large. By
averaging over i we obtain:
ǫm =
M∑
i=1
i(1−
ǫw
N
)i−1
ǫw
N
+ (M + 1)(1−
ǫw
N
)M (16)
ǫm =
ǫw
N
1− (1− ǫw
N
)M
( ǫw
N
)2
+ (1−
ǫw
N
)M (17)
since (1− ǫw/N)
M = (N −M)/N , we have:
ǫw(ǫm −
N −M
M
) =M (18)
3.3. Numerical Simulations
The simualtion result is shown in Fig.1. Without loss of generality, we
fix the number of men equal to 1000 and vary the number of women M from
1 to 2000. Under our definition of single’s energy, as our theoretical result
predicted, the average energy of men increases in the beninning and almost
saturate when M reaches around 700. The energy plateau is mainly caused
by our definition that single men’s energy isM+1. Although other definition
may apply, we choose this definition out of many reasonable ones because
it facilitates our theoretical analysis. It is notable that the average energy
is low when M is close to 1. It is insturctive to many social phenomena.
When woman are too few(M close to 1 ), most of men end up single in the
matching. But one’s feeling of happiness, as written by the sociologist Ruut
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Figure 1: The average energy of N men and M women versus the number of women M ,
N is set to 1000. The result is obtained by averaging over 100 realizations. The dots and
their error bars represent the simulations result and the standard deviation, the solid lines
indicate our theoretical predictions.
Veenhoven[21],”...happiness results from comparison...”, may come from the
relative comparison among surroudings.
The energy of both men and women have dramatic changes when M
approaches to 1000. The energy of men has a sharp drop in this region
while the energy of women experiences a big rise. The energy of active
side and passive side exchange their positions. As M increses, the energy
of men continues to decrease, at the meantime, the energy of women keeps
growing which is natural for the situation that more women competes for a
certain number of men. In total, our simulation result verified our previous
theoretical analysis.
For many of the actual matching problems, the change in the number of
people’s happiness is not as sensitive to the theoretical predictions. This may
be due to some intrinsic factors, such as appearance, test scores, university
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rankings, work ability, salary level, etc., which will cause the wish list to
become relevant. One of our studies recently reveals that the correlation
of the peoples wish lists can significantly reduce the inherent instability of
Gale-Shapley Algorithm on unequal numbers of people.
4. Conclusion
In summary, we extend the study of conventional bipartite matching prob-
lem to unequal numbers of two sides. This advancement has a realistic impact
because the numbers of matching parties are often different in many scenarios
in the real world, and the losers of the competition are widespread. For the
traditional N male N female matching problem, it is widely accepted that the
Gale-Shapley algorithm leads to a matching result in which the active side
occupies a huge advantage. However, we find that even by reducing only one
woman, the men of the active side become obviously disadvantageous, which
means that original stable matching solution is super sensitive for changes in
the number of matching members.
In this paper we thoroughly study the matching solution of unequally
siezed Stable Mariiage Problem, and provide both theoretical solution and
numerical simulations. These discoveries help us to further understand the
structure and properties of the SMP solution, it also sheds a light on the
matching when match makers or resource allocators who need to deal with
many of the real bipartite matching problems with scarsity of one side.
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